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Abstract 
 
Emotion plays a big role in our daily decision making. The present study investigates 
the influence of emotional feedback on a group representative in an intergroup negotiation. 
This influence is measured by the level of applied changes in offer the representative makes 
towards the negotiation counterpart. Besides the control condition a distinction was made 
between the emotions happiness, anger and disappointment. This experimental study design 
investigated whether the negative emotions cause larger differences in offer than the positive 
emotions. Besides it explored the possible influence of the need to belong, narcissism and 
power. In total 142 Dutch students took part in two negotiation rounds of the same scenario 
and they filled in several questionnaires. The results show that when participants receive 
angry feedback from their adherents, they significantly lower their offer in as well the 
negotiation round about money (p = .024) as the negotiation round about delivery time (p 
= .023). The deviation score of the control condition is also significantly different from zero 
in the first negotiation (p = .024). An unexpected result can be found in the control condition, 
where participants also significantly change their offer (p = .024) but in the opposite direction 
as anger: they bid a higher actual offer than they proposed. This finding may be a 
consequence of a difference in the scenario between the experimental and control condition 
about the expectation of feedback from the other group members. Another important aspect of 
the experiment to remember is the importance of the height of the proposal, because the actual 
offer depends on it and therefore also the deviation score. In the second negotiation is a 
significant offer change between the disappointment condition and the happy (p = .004) and 
control condition (p = .005), possibly because the participants feel guilty towards the 
adherents. Anger and disappointment do not have a different proposal offer, actual offer and 
deviation score. 
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Emotion in intergroup negotiations 
 
Behavioral adjustments after happy, angry, disappointed and lack of feedback 
 
Intergroup negotiation takes place between two or more parties who would like to find 
an agreement together. A core element is (the perception of) conflicting interests. In such a 
negotiation, especially when the groups are too large to hear out every voice, often a 
representative negotiator is the face and voice of the negotiating party. All presented 
standpoints are therefore linked to the front man. However, the negotiator who presents the 
standpoints may in fact be of other opinion, but representing the opinion of other group 
members. Examples can be found in everyday life like employees working for a company, the 
profession of lawyer, politicians being part of a party, real estate agents selling houses or even 
parents having each others’ back: sometimes you  just share another opinion because you take 
concerns into account of fellow-thinkers. 
Research about intergroup negotiations so far has focused on several aspects with 
reference to the influence of the party the negotiator has to represent. For example Steinel, De 
Dreu, Ouwehand and Ramírez-Marín (2009) were pioneers in investigating the effect of 
opposing opinions between the different group members. Therefore they created an 
experimental paradigm in which representatives negotiated on behalf of a divided 
constituency with a minority of hawks; doves; high status or low status. The conclusion was 
that hawkish minorities are persuasive and influential because representatives accord more 
weight to hawkish than to dovish messages. 
A later similar study of Aaldering and De Dreu (2012) also examined intergroup 
conflicts and how within-constituent disagreement influences representative negotiations. The 
results showed that representatives negotiated more integrative agreements that benefited both 
groups when their constituency was predominantly dovish, but only when the hawkish 
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minority had low status. When the hawkish minority had high status, representatives were as 
competitive as they were when their constituency was predominantly hawkish. Other research, 
seen from a larger perspective, was conducted to investigate differences between 
individualistic and collectivistic cultures (Gelfand & Realo, 1999), so with that personal 
characteristics, in this case derived from upbringing. Results from a laboratory study and from 
a judgment found that collectivism moderated the effects of accountability on negotiators' 
psychological states, behaviors and outcomes. The hawks and doves paradigm is based on 
cooperative and competitive behavior from the adherents. The goal of this behavior is to 
communicate an opinion towards the representative. This communication is similar to 
expressing emotions in order to give a message, because also expressions of emotion are 
social cues for the environment. 
To get more insight into the impact of the adherents on the way a representative 
negotiator behaves, this study investigates several aspects according to making decisions for a 
group, emotions of the adherents (on which will be dwelled on further) and personality traits 
of the negotiator. Difference with earlier research is a focus on the interpersonal effect; the 
effects of one negotiator’s emotions on the other negotiator’s behavior, within an intergroup 
context; the involvement of groups on the background of a negotiation, and thus possible 
different interests, in a negotiation between two people. Especially for emotionally charged 
negotiations it is important to understand why we make the decisions we make, even though 
we sometimes do not fully support the stance. In this study we will focus on the effect of 
emotions during a negotiation in intergroup context: what is the effect of the emotions that 
group members display on the bargaining behavior of the group representative? We want to 
make a distinction between the emotions the constituents’ show towards the representative 
negotiator, using the positive emotion happiness and the negative emotions anger and 
disappointment. Hereafter we will explore the importance of emotion in negotiations. 
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Especially three of the most common and so far most investigated emotions (happiness, anger 
and disappointment) are explored in the behavioral effects they had in previous experiments. 
The influence of having high scores on need to belong, narcissism and power are also 
investigated in this study and will be explored too in their connection with behavior change in 
negotiations. 
 
Emotion 
Emotions are an important aspect of our daily decision-making. Rationally seen, we 
are able to juxtapose different options and therefore different outcomes. On the contrary when 
emotion is involved in the decision-making process, the rational viewpoint may fade to the 
background. This distinguishing between the rational and emotional element of a decision can 
be found in individual decision, but also in group decisions. When you are in the position of 
representative negotiator for an intergroup negotiation, you have to take more opinions into 
account than solely your own opinion. This can be a difficult task when you and your 
adherents do not share the same opinion on a specific topic. There are three possible outcomes 
for this problem: (1) the negotiator fully adapts the opinion of the adherents, (2) the negotiator 
fully bases the decision fully on his or her own opinion or (3) the negotiator mediates between 
the own opinion and the opinion of the adherents. The third outcome can be seen from a 
fluctuating scale, differing in the amount of adjustment. According to the interpersonal 
approach, behavior is influenced by others’ emotional expressions by providing information 
to the observers (Van Kleef, 2009). The emotions as social information (EASI)-model (Van 
Kleef, 2009) predicts when and how emotional expressions affect behavior at the 
interpersonal level. Two processes from this model that describe how observers’ behavior 
may be influenced are inferential processes; providing relevant information about the situation, 
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and affective reactions; affecting observers’ emotions and liking of the expresser. The relative 
predictive strength of these paths depends on the observer’s information processing and on 
social-relational factors. These two classes of moderators may operate separately or in parallel 
and in any order. For this study especially the affective pathway is interesting, because we 
want to know how emotional expressions affect observers’ behavior by triggering inferential 
processes and/or affective reactions in them. 
Another topic of earlier research about emotions in negotiations is the emotional 
orientation. Zooming in on the emotions of the adherents, especially on the negative emotions 
anger and disappointment; they can be directed towards the offer or towards the negotiator, so 
offer- or person-oriented. In an important study with a computer-mediated negotiation 
(Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2008) participants received happy or angry messages from 
their opponent, which were behavior directed or person directed. This study found that 
behavior-oriented anger, in comparison to happiness, raised negotiator’s estimates of their 
counterpart’s limits and thereby elicited concessions, because the anger has clear strategic 
implications. The angry emotion may even lead to a competitive response when it is person-
directed because the strategic implication is unclear.  
A following study of Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, Steinel and Van Kleef (2011) 
also examined the behavioral effects of the feedback of the adherents and the dependency on 
the type of negative emotion that is communicated and the difference between person- and 
offer oriented emotions. They found that anger elicits concessions when it is offer-directed 
and not when it is person-directed, because offer-directed anger signals high limits. Hereafter 
we will discuss the three emotions we will investigate during our study: happiness, anger and 
disappointment, and the effect they can invoke in others. Because the main goal of this study 
is to investigate the extent to which the front man changes his or her negotiation behavior 
(offer more or less than intended) and the difference in offer changes between these three 
Page | 6  
 
emotions, the investigation of emotions will solely have our focus, with a neutral direction of 
the emotion towards the negotiator. In the subsequent paragraph I will summarize what is the 
known effect of happiness, disappointment and anger in social interactions.  
 
Happiness –Most research around emotion in negotiations so far has been done by 
comparing positive and negative emotions, especially the comparison between happiness and 
anger. Kopelman, Rosette and Thompson (2006) also made this comparison by testing the 
influence of strategically displaying positive, negative, and neutral emotions on negotiation 
outcomes in a laboratory setting. Kopelman et al.(2006) hypothesized for this experiment that 
(1) target negotiators will be more likely to concede to focal negotiators who display negative 
emotion than those who display positive emotion and that (2) target negotiators will be more 
likely to concede to focal negotiators who display positive emotion. The first two experiments 
showed that negotiators who displayed positive emotions were more likely to incorporate a 
future (business) relationship in the negotiated contract; and that managers who strategically 
display positive emotions were more likely to close a deal. Therefore these results support the 
hypothesis that induced positive emotion and good mood increase cooperative tactics and 
enhance the quality of agreements. The third and last experiment of this research was about 
proposed counteroffers and making concessions in a distributive setting. Participants had to 
actively engage in the negotiation process by making a counteroffer that reflected their own 
demands, instead of simply accepting or rejecting an offer. The display of positive emotion 
was found to be a more effective strategy for gaining concessions from the other party in a 
distributive setting. Negotiators made more extreme demands when facing a negotiator 
strategically displaying negative, rather than positive or neutral, emotions. Therefore the 
possibility, or even probability, of having more negotiations with the same negotiator is 
therefore also of interest: negotiators who displayed positive emotion were more likely to 
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anticipate a long-term relationship than negotiators who displayed negative or neutral 
emotions. With this knowledge it is also a logical consistency that the chance to get a 
deadlock when showing positive emotions is low: negotiators experiencing positive emotion 
subsequently reached more mutually beneficial outcomes in a face-to-face bargaining task 
than did the control group. This shows that acceptation of an offer is an axiomatic next step 
when group members show happy emotions. Besides, showing happy or neutral emotions can 
be linked back to the hawks and doves paradigm (Steinel et al., 2009), where these emotions 
can be categorized as cooperative points of view. Because dovish minorities are less 
persuasive and influential, representatives accord more weight to hawkish than to dovish 
messages. Happy and neutral emotions can be classified as dovish (cooperative) influence, 
wherefore we do not expect a distinction in behavior for happy and non emotional reactions, 
especially separated from hawkish (competitive) feedback of group members. In addition, 
happy and neutral emotions alone do not give a direct sign to change the current course of 
action. Instead, it is a social cue to proceed with the current behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Representatives of which the adherents show happy or neutral emotions 
are expected to have no significant changes in their concessions. 
 
Anger - In previous research of Van Kleef, De Dreu and Manstead (2004) the 
interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations were investigated in three 
negotiations where the participants received information about the emotional state of the 
opponent. The results show that participants with an angry opponent place lower demands and 
make larger concessions than participants with a happy opponent, where participants with a 
non-emotional opponent take an intermediate position. This decision making process based on 
emotion is in line with the strategic-choice hypothesis of the EASI model (Van Kleef, 2009): 
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the concession of a negotiator is larger when the opponent shows an angry emotion than when 
he shows a happy emotion because it is more plausible that the angry opponents has a higher 
limit, thereby increasing the negotiator’s need to make concessions to avoid an impasse. In 
addition, this research states that anger on the part of the opponent elicits compliance in the 
focal negotiator, whereas happiness elicits exploitation. Boundary conditions for this effect 
are the negotiators’ need for closure or time constraints that increase the pressure to reach an 
agreement. An interesting mediation analysis in the same study of Van Kleef et al. (2004) 
showed that the moderating effect of the opponent’s communicated emotion was caused by 
increased levels of fear in participants who received angry communications.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Angry emotions of the adherents lead to larger concessions among the  
representatives than happy or neutral emotions. 
 
Disappointment – Besides anger, disappointment has also proven to be an outstanding 
emotion to induce concessions (Lelieveld et al., 2011). In later research of Lelieveld, Van 
Dijk, Van Beest and Van Kleef (2013) the emotion of disappointment in negotiations was 
further highlighted. Interesting with disappointment is that there is found an inconsistency. 
Because disappointment communicates weakness, the other person or party may take 
advantage when bargaining. However, when guilt was evoked in the target during the 
negotiation, this elicits generous offers. This is called the inconsistency in the social-
functional approach. In comparison to anger, an emotion that does not communicate weakness 
but seems like a threat, guilt does not surface. The high limits that anger communicates may 
lead to higher offers to avoid impasse. In contrast with anger, the expression of 
disappointment can be effective under particular circumstances, whereby ingroup members 
can expect higher levels of guilt caused by disappointment than outgroup members. Another 
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experiment of Van Doorn, Van Kleef and Van der Pligt (2015) investigated the interpersonal 
effects of anger and disappointment on compliance with requests. In the experiment 
participants received a scenario with a request for help that was accompanied by an 
expression of anger or disappointment. After reading the scenario, participants indicated their 
willingness to comply with the request. This study concluded that expressing disappointment 
can increase compliance with requests, whereas expressing anger may undermine such 
compliance. Mediation analyses proved that disappointment was more effective than anger in 
eliciting compliance because it was perceived as more appropriate for the context.  
In another study of Van Kleef, De Dreu and Manstead (2006) the social effects of 
emotions related to supplication and appeasement in conflict and negotiation were studied 
with a computer-simulated negotiation. Supplication goes hand in hand with feelings like 
sadness, disappointment, fear, and worry. Because of these emotions the person will try to 
relieve the other one’s pain by making concessions: helping behavior. Appeasement on the 
other hand, has its focus on a guilt, shame, embarrassment and interpersonal regret. Of these 
emotions, guilt is perhaps the most extensively researched and the experience of guilt is 
typically rooted in an interpersonal context. The experimental design included the opponent’s 
emotion as the independent variable and the demand level as the main dependent variable. 
The investigated emotions were disappointment, worry, guilt, regret and no emotion as a 
control condition. The results showed that negotiators tend to make larger concessions to 
opponents who experience disappointment or worry (supplication emotions) than to non 
emotional opponents, whereas they make smaller concessions to adversaries who experience 
guilt or regret (appeasement emotions). This means that negotiators with a guilty opponent 
adopted higher goals than did those with a disappointed opponent. This finding is congruent 
with the results of the previous mentioned study of Lelieveld et al. (2013): guilt on top of 
Page | 10  
 
disappointment elicits more generous offers than disappointment alone, and guilt is more 
likely to surface with a disappointing emotion than with an angry emotion.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Emotions of disappointment of the adherents lead to larger concessions  
among the representatives than neutral, happy or angry emotions. 
 
Need to belong 
The difference that guilt or regret (appeasement issues) adopts higher goals than 
disappointment (supplication issues) has a lot to do with the levels of trust of the negotiator. 
The study of Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead (2006) showed that negotiators with a guilty 
opponent adopted higher goals than did those with a disappointed opponent. Also, negotiators 
with high levels of trust adapted their demands to their counterpart’s emotion, but those with 
low trust did not. We can easily connect this issue of trust to the need to belong, which might 
be a quite interesting new link. The need to belong of the negotiator is the desire for 
interpersonal attachments, which is a fundamental human motivation. It is an influential factor 
for the confirmation of the offer, associated with the influence of power. The need to belong 
also appears to conform to motivational patterns of satiation and substitution (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995). Self-sacrifice is argued to be positively influenced by the leaders’ sense of 
belongingness to the group they supervise (Hoogervorst, De Cremer, Van Dijke & Mayer, 
2012). Two field studies supported the prediction that leaders’ sense of belongingness 
promotes self-sacrifice particularly among leaders who are low in subjective power. Leaders 
who are high in sense of power do not need to experience a sense of belonging in order to 
display self-sacrifice. Therefore representatives with a higher need to belong are more willing 
to conform their decision to the opinion of the adherents compared to representatives with a 
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lower need to belong. An interesting finding in this study is that the subjectively sensed power 
of the leader can serve as a moderator of the self-sacrificing effect.  
 The study of Steinel et al. (2010) also investigated the influence of the representative’s 
need to belong on behavior in intergroup negotiations, besides the representative’s standing in 
a group and group norm. They made a division between prototypical group members, who 
strongly match the group prototypes, and peripheral members, who are less prototypical 
examples of their group. The need to belong can be seen as an influential factor a moderator 
for the motivation to be accepted. Prototypical representatives behaved according to the group 
norm regardless of whether they had a high or low need to belong. Peripheral representatives, 
in contrast, determine their level of adjustment on the basis of their need to belong and only 
adhere to the group norm when their need to belong is high. Being a peripheral group member 
may mean that this person as a representative has the feeling of being low in status and 
therefore being in less power.  
At last, research of Saygi, Greer, Van Kleef and De Dreu (2014) concluded that 
competitive communication as well as early competition by a group representative during an 
intergroup negotiation can harm intergroup relations more compared to cooperative 
communication and late competition by a group representative, even if the negotiated 
outcome is the same. This means that the fear of persons with a high need to belong that 
competition has a bad influence on intergroup relations is a real, confirmed fear. To obtain 
positive intergroup relations, separately seen from obtaining the best possible group results in 
the negotiation, cooperative behavior is in general better than competitive behavior. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Representatives with a high need to belong are more willing to adjust 
the proposal offer when receiving negative feedback (anger or disappointment) than 
representatives with a low need to belong. 
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Narcissism 
 Another possible parameter with impact in negotiations is narcissism. There can be 
made a difference between (1) the high functioning level of narcissism; having a normal 
personal development with realistic self-regard and mature aspirations and ideals (Moore & 
Fine 1990; as described in Greenhalgh & Gilkey, 1997), and (2) narcissistic impairment; 
characterized by fragile self-esteem, grandiosity and self-preoccupation, and exploitative, 
unstable relationships with others. Besides this difference in degrees, narcissists are also 
described as contemptuous of others and apt to respond to criticism with highly negative and 
personal counterattacks (4th ed., text rev.; DSM–IV–TR; American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). In their research, Greenhalgh and Gilkey (1997) focused on the narcissism construct 
for two reasons: (1) it is the most fundamental dimension used by clinicians to assess how 
individuals function in relation to others, and (2) it has a close resemblance to interpersonal 
orientation. They found that narcissistic functioning is an important variable underlying broad 
individual differences in negotiating approach. Narcissistically impaired individuals will 
ignore or sacrifice the relationship for personal gain, which will reduce solidarity as well. 
Capacity for empathy determines whether the negotiator has a good understanding for the 
other party and the skills to anticipate on their situation and feelings. This would mean that 
the more one is narcissistic impaired, the less capacity for empathy one has, the less one can 
anticipate on other visions than their own and possibly ignore other visions when these are 
incongruent with the own vision.  
 Another study of Smalley and Stake (1996) compared the effects of self-esteem and 
narcissism on evaluations of negative feedback sources, with narcissism and self-esteem as a 
moderator for feedback. High self-esteem participants were not more likely to respond to 
negative feedback by derogating the evaluator, but were more critical of the test battery. Self-
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esteem did not predict greater hostility, in fact; self-esteem was associated with more positive 
and less negative affect. In contrast, narcissism predicted derogation of the evaluator 
and hostility. In this study all forms of feedback source derogation predicted by narcissism 
were associated more closely with hostility and negative affect than with positive affect. 
Therefore participants higher in narcissism showed more defensiveness in their reaction, like 
less hostility to negative feedback and less positive affect after receiving negative feedback, 
than low narcissism participants.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Representatives with a high score on narcissism are less willing to 
adjust their offer than representatives with a low to average score on narcissism, 
independent of the emotion received by adherents. 
 
Power 
Also power differences in the relationship between the negotiator and the adherents 
seem to influence the outcome of the decision making process. The study of Lelieveld et al. 
(2012) emphasizes the importance of affective reactions and the role of having power. The 
results indicate a moderation of the effects of anger by power. Anger leads to higher offers 
when it is reported by a high-power bargainer and it leads to lower offers when it is reported 
by a low-power bargainer. So participants offered more to high-power than to low-power 
angry opponents, which can be explained by evoked fear. In addition, when a low-power 
opponent expresses anger, the angry emotion elicits reciprocal anger and fewer concessions. 
Even the negotiation time is affected by inter-organizational power of boundary-spanning 
persons, with less negotiation time when the representatives’ power within the organization is 
high (Jackson & King, 1983). Another finding that supports the finding that representatives 
who feel high in power are less willing to adjust towards anger expression of the adherents 
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than negotiators in a low power position is that high-power negotiators make smaller 
concessions than low-power negotiators (Pinkley, 1995). The following hypothesis is based 
on this theory, associated with the previous theory about the need to belong: anger, as 
negative emotional feedback, elicits high offers only when the emotion is expressed by a high 
power negotiator; when it is expressed by a negotiator with low power, anger elicits reciprocal 
anger and fewer concessions (Lelieveld et al. 2012). 
 
Hypothesis 6: Representatives who feel low in power are more willing to adjust the 
proposal offer for negative feedback in comparison to high power representatives. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 The participants of this study were 142 students recruited at Leiden University, other 
Universities and other colleges of higher education. The recruitment was by Sona, social 
media, a distribution of flyers and asking friends. The participants were between 18 and 36 
years old (M = 21.62, SD = 2.82). They were deemed to have no prior knowledge of the 
research goal. Prior the experiment participants signed an informed consent (see Appendix I). 
After full participation in the experiment participants got a reward for their participation in the 
form of credits or money, which was €5.50 for an hour of participation time.  
 
Negotiation task 
The scenario used in this study is based on a scenario developed by Robertson (2011). 
Participants had to imagine themselves in the position of the financial commission of the 
student union. They had to negotiate about the price with the representative of an organization 
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that distributes the summaries among the students. The participant himself negotiated on 
behalf of the four student members of the union that makes the summaries. The negotiator of 
the other party was also a representative of a group. Only the two negotiators were able to 
make, change, accept or decline the offer, but the group members had the possibility to give 
feedback to the representative. The scenario we used contained two negotiations. The first one 
similar to the negation of Robertson (2011) about price and the second negation is comparable 
to the first one, but now the topic of discussion is the delivery time in weeks. Because the 
negotiation transpires between two parties this is an intergroup negotiation. 
 In the experiment all participants were assigned to the role of negotiator. They 
were the representative of a group of four persons in total (the representative negotiator was 
also made believe that there were three other group members) and they were responsible for 
the actual offers. The first negotiation round was about selling the summaries for at least the 
costs of making them (200 euro). When the team receives a higher price, a gain is made. The 
second negotiation round was about discussing the delivery time in weeks with a minimum of 
two weeks. This is especially important for the students who want to buy the summaries, so 
they can begin to prepare for the exam earlier when the delivery time in weeks is faster and 
thus more weeks before the exam. A shorter delivery time is more beneficial. 
The scenario can be divided into five phases: 
Phase 1: The alleged opponent started the negotiation with an offer. A high offer of 
money and a low offer of delivery time were optimum for their party, but adverse for 
the other party where the participant is involved as a negotiator. 
Phase 2: The participant, always in the role of the negotiator, proposed a counter offer. 
This counteroffer was then presented to the group members, who did or did not give 
feedback. 
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Phase 3 – experimental conditions: The four adherents gave feedback during the 
negotiation in order to let the participant know their thoughts about the proposal offer. 
In total three different reactions were provided during the feedback whereby the 
difference can be made between the emotions happiness, anger and disappointment. 
All the adherents reacted in a homogeneous way, meaning all three group members 
showed the same emotional feedback.  
Phase 3 – control conditions: The four adherents did not give feedback and the 
negotiator did not receive any emotional feedback. 
Phase 4: After receiving emotional feedback (in the experimental condition) or not (in 
the control condition) the participant was asked if they did or did not wanted to change 
their proposal offer.  A new offer, the actual offer, had to be filled in when the 
participant decided to change the proposed offer. If the participant wanted to contain 
the negotiation with the proposed offer, the same number has to be filled in again.  
 
Procedure 
Prior to the participation in the lab experiment research and before presenting the 
scenario, the participants will be asked to read and sign the informed consent form. This 
contains a short introduction of the study. The informed consent is also important to point out 
confidentiality of personal information, that participation takes place on voluntary basis and 
that participants are allowed to end their engagement anytime. The study will start with a 
questionnaire about demographic information. Before the scenario is presented the 
participants will also fill in a questionnaire as a control measure for pre-mood, to test if all 
conditions have a similar emotional mood at the start of the experiment. The participants had 
to fill in twelve propositions on a seven point scale with propositions about their mood, 
ending the sentence ‘I feel…’ with happy, joyful, sad, disappointed, angry, mad, dismal, 
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sorrowful, anxious, disgust and nausea. Hereafter the participants will receive the negotiation 
scenario about selling summaries with negotiations about money and delivery time. After the 
two negotiation rounds of the scenario the participants will fill in the three different 
questionnaires, containing questions about the need to belong, narcissism and the subjective 
sense of power (see more about these questionnaires under ‘dependent variables’ and in the 
appendices). After the experiment took place, the participants had to fill in another 
questionnaire as a manipulation check to test for the validity of the emotional feedback, to test 
if the participants knew what kind of emotion their group members expressed towards them. 
The participants had to fill in six propositions on a seven point scale with propositions about 
their group members. They had to answer the sentence ‘One or more of my group members 
were…’ that ended with the words angry, happy, disappointed, anxious, disgusted or sad. 
After the experiment and questionnaires the participants got a debriefing about the research 
and they received a reward for their participation and contribution. 
 
Independent variables 
In this study the independent variable is the emotion the adherents show as feedback 
towards the negotiator on the proposal offer, which can be positive (happiness), neutral 
(control) or negative (anger or disappointment). The study design therefore is a factor, 
emotion of the constituency, with four levels: happy, angry, disappointed and no-emotion 
control. In addition, we can describe the independent variable as the constituency type, 
namely based on emotional response. This emotional response will be manipulated by 
determining in advance which emotion the adherents will homogeneously show on a made bid.  
To make the adherents more life-like and to avoid gender related biases at the same 
time, we gave the adherents unisex names (unisex at the moment of this writing in the 
Netherlands). We also wrote the feedback comments in an informal manner to meet the 
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students. Examples of statements are “Your suggestion makes me happy. Great!” (happiness), 
“I read your suggestion and to be fair, for me it just really feels like a bummer.” 
(disappointment) and “Your suggestion actually pissed me off!” (anger).  See all emotional 
statements for both negotiation rounds in Appendix III: the manipulation of emotional 
response (in Dutch). 
 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable is the negotiation behavior of the group representative. After 
the control measures and manipulation checks, the participants, as sellers on behalf of a 
student union, met an alleged buyer and successively negotiated about the price and the 
delivery time of lecture materials. At first they made a proposal offer and then they received 
emotional feedback from their adherents. Hereafter they made their actual offer towards the 
other group representative. Also independent of the feedback, like in the no-emotion control 
condition, participants can adjust their proposal offer. Besides looking at differences between 
the proposal offers of conditions and between the actual offers of conditions, we measure the 
difference by calculating the offer before (proposal) minus the offer after (actual) the 
adherents give their feedback. Participants’ offer before and after receiving feedback with the 
emotion happiness, anger, disappointment and control condition linked to it. The difference 
between those offers can be seen as a concession. We call this the adjustment-by-feedback 
score. The offer range for the first negotiation round is between 200 and 600 euro and the 
offer range for the second negotiation round is between two and eight weeks. Asking for a 
high price for the summaries in negotiation round 1 ((close to) 600 euro) and asking for a 
faster delivery time and therefore less weeks ((close to) two weeks), can be seen as 
competitive behavior. When a low price ((closer to) 200 euro) and/or a low amount of weeks 
((close to) eight weeks) are asked from the other party, the behavior is more cooperative.  
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Moderating variables 
Besides the dependent and independent variables, three possible moderating variables 
are taking into account as well: the need to belong, narcissism and power (as subjective sense). 
At the end of the scenario and before the end of the experiment, the participants are asked to 
fill in three questionnaires about these possible moderators. 
To measure the need to belong of the participants, we use the Need to Belong Scale of 
Leary (2013) with questions like ‘I want other people to accept me’ and ‘I do not like being 
alone’ (recoded). The need to belong was measured on a five point scale, with one meaning 
‘strongly disagree’ and five meaning ‘strongly agree’. See Appendix IV for the full 
questionnaire, translated into Dutch. Answers on these 15 items were highly intercorrelated (α 
= .778), therefore I averaged the answers into an overall need to belong score (M = 4.68, SD 
= .85). 
 To measure narcissism we used the NPI-16, which is a short measure of subclinical 
narcissism that has shown meaningful face, internal, discriminant and predictive validity. It 
can serve as an alternative measure of narcissism when situations do not allow the use of 
longer inventories (Ames, Rose & Anderson, 2006).  Participants had to choose one out of 
two options, a dichotomous answer scale, on sixteen propositions. For example, they had to 
choose between ‘I am more capable than other people’ and ‘There is a lot that I can learn 
from other people’. See Appendix V for the full questionnaire of the NPI-16 narcissism scale. 
Answers on these sixteen items were intercorrelated (α = .695), but this correlation gets higher 
when the eleventh item is deleted (α = .707) which we did to raise the scale reliability. This 
item contained the choice between answering ‘I always know what I am doing’ and 
‘Sometimes I am not sure of what I am doing’. With fifteen variables I averaged the answers 
into an overall narcissism score (M = 1.24, SD = .17). 
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 To measure power, we use the subjective sense of power scale of Anderson, John and 
Keltner (2006). The participants had to answer on a seven point scale, with one meaning 
‘disagree strongly’ and seven meaning ‘agree strongly’.  Examples of statements that had to 
answered are “I think I have a great deal of power” and “Even if I voice them, my views have 
little sway” (recoded). See Appendix VI for the full generalized version of the questionnaire 
about the Sense of Power Scale. Answers on these eight items were highly intercorrelated (α 
= .825), therefore I averaged the answers into an overall power score (M = 5.08, SD = .73). 
 All three moderators were used as independent variables in ANOVAs, wherefore they 
have been categorized by median split. 
 
Results 
 
Descriptive analysis 
For the analysis it was important that the participant made two offers: a proposal offer 
and an actual offer. Because the emotional feedback was between the two bids, a deviating 
actual offer may be caused by the emotion showed by the adherents. On basis of these two 
offers it was possible to tell if there is a difference between the two offers or not, the so called 
difference score. Therefore we checked how many participants filled in both offers with the 
Missing Value Analysis. Two groups can be distinguished here, namely (1) the group of 
participants that gave as well a proposal offer as an actual offer and (2) the group of 
participants that gave or only a proposal offer or only an actual offer. This missing value in 
offer was possible because some participants mistakenly filled in the letter A (“I want to 
accept Jamie’s offer and present the same offer” / “I want to continue presenting my original 
decision to Jamie) or B (“I want to reject Jamie’s offer and present a new offer” / “After 
Page | 21  
 
receiving feedback of my community group I want to change my original suggestion before 
presenting it to Jamie.”) 
For the first negotiation (price) 139 participants filled in a proposal offer (M = 459.71, 
SD = 122.39) and 132 participants filled in an actual offer (M = 470.29, SD = 100.76) There 
was no overlap in these participants wherefore 13 out of 142 had a missing value in one of 
two offers. Thus for 129 participants (M = 1.33, SD = 84.39) it was possible to analyze a 
deviation score between both offers in the first negotiation. In addition, there can be noticed a 
difference between the offer height of the large group that filled in both offers and the smaller 
group that filled in only one offer.  
At first I performed a Missing Value Analysis and analyzed this difference in offer 
height for the first negotiation round about discussing offering an amount of money between 
200 and 600. The group that only filled in the proposal offer had on average a lower proposal 
offer (M = 320.00, SD = 158.43) than the group with both offers (M = 470.53, SD = 112.01). 
The group that only filled in the actual offer showed the opposite effect and had on average a 
higher actual offer (M = 516.67, SD = 62.36) than the actual offer of the group with both 
offers (M = 469.21, SD = 101.23).  
Hereafter we analyzed this difference in offer height for the second negotiation round 
about discussing the number of delivery time in amount of weeks between two and seven. The 
group that only filled in a proposal offer had on average a higher first offer (M = 5.10, SD = 
1.58) than the group who filled in both offers (M = 3.57, SD = .09). The group that only gave 
an actual offer showed again the opposite effect and had on average a lower actual offer (M = 
2.00, SD = .00) than the actual offer of the group who filled in both the proposal and actual 
offer (M = 3.44, SD = 1.10).  
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Manipulation checks and control measures 
At first a control measure was executed on difference in mood before the experiment 
took place to check for a difference in emotional state between participants in the four 
conditions at the beginning of the experiment. When we have a similar emotional mood at the 
start of the experiment, any differences in emotion are not due to a difference in mood 
between conditions. Before the scenario we asked them questions about how they felt to take 
away any experimental biases by transferable emotional effects.  A one-way ANOVA was 
executed with emotion as independent variable and the mood of the participant before the 
scenario (pre-mood) as dependent variable. The conditions did not significantly differ 
(p > .163), so we can conclude that the measured effects are caused by the scenario and not by 
a different emotional state between conditions at the beginning of the experiment. 
Secondly a manipulation check was executed to get more insight into the validity of 
the different emotions. For example: did participants see the angry feedback as angry, or did 
they consider it as happy, disappointed or no emotion at all? We used a questionnaire with a 
seven point answer scale wherein participants were asked if one or more of their adherents 
were angry, happy, disappointed, scared or sad or showed disgust. A one-way ANOVA was 
executed with emotion as independent variable and as dependent variables the manipulation 
check variables that measure the emotion that participants experienced in the condition. The 
ANOVA results show significant scores for all emotions: anger (F (3, 138) = 253.14, p = .00), 
happiness (F (3, 138) = 237.22, p = .00), disappointment (F (3, 138) = 102.28, p = .00), 
anxiety (F (3, 138) = 8.67, p = .00), disgust (F (3, 138) = 65.338, p = .00) and sadness (F (3, 
138) = 17.26, p = .00). Because of these scores we can assume that the emotional statements 
came across the way they were meant to be. Means with different subscripts in a row differ at 
p < .05 according to Duncan test. Especially anger, happiness and disappointment were 
recognizable as emotions according to the participants. Anxiety was least linked to happiness 
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and more to no emotion, disappointment and anger. Disgust is mostly categorized as anger, 
while sadness was mostly categorized as disappointment. See all means and standard 
deviations of the manipulation check on how emotions are perceived in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Means and standard deviations for how emotions are perceived (manipulation check) 
  Anger Happiness Disapp. Control Total 
N  34 35 36 37 142 
Perceived 
happiness 
M 6.67 1.26 1.36 4.24 3.38 
SD .55 .89 .59 1.59 2.47 
Perceived 
anger 
M 1.09 
 
6.83 5.61 2.86 
 
4.11 
SD .29 . 38 1.02 1.53 2.44 
Perceived 
disappointment  
M 1.18 5.20 6.28 3.08 3.96 
SD .46 1.92 1.09 1.38 2.36 
Perceived 
anxiety 
M 1.12 2.17  2.42 2.59 2.09 
SD .33 1.52 1.52 1.48 1.43 
Perceived 
disgust 
M 1.09 5.26 4.14 2.08  3.15 
SD .29 1.63 1.79 1.30  2.14 
Perceived 
sadness 
M 1.09 2.77 3.53 2.08 2.38 
SD .29 1.83 1.86 1.32 1.71 
 
 
Hypotheses about differences between emotions 
The first three hypotheses are about comparing deviation scores between a 
participants’ offer before and after receiving feedback with the emotion happiness, anger, 
disappointment and control condition linked to it. This is the adjustment-by-feedback score. 
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To test for the adjustment-by-feedback score and see if there is any significant difference at 
all between at least two out of four conditions of emotion (happy, angry, disappointed and 
control) and the way they differ in their proposal offer and change their offer after receiving 
feedback, we executed a one-way ANOVA. Emotion was used as the independent variable 
and the proposal and actual offer of both negotiations were used as the dependent variable, 
meaning we executed this test four times. In this analysis the difference was measured 
between the proposal scores of all conditions and between the actual scores of all conditions, 
for both negotiations.  
At first we perform an ANOVA for the first negotiation round.  The results of the 
ANOVA with the proposal offer of the first negotiation round as dependent variable and the 
emotional feedback conditions as independent variable revealed a significant score between 
conditions for the proposal offer (F (3, 135) = 3.497, p = .017). For the actual offer, however, 
there is no significant difference (F (3, 128) = .781, p = .781). At last, the executed score for 
adjustment-by-feedback, the first proposed offer minus the second actual offer, is again 
significant (F (3, 125) = 5.023, p = .003). A Bonferroni post hoc test shows that this 
significant score for the proposal offer can be found between the control and anger condition 
(p = .015). The control condition has a lower proposal offer (M = 405.88, SD = 150.63) than 
the anger condition (M = .494.57). The Bonferroni post hoc test shows that also the significant 
result for the adjustment-by-feedback deviation score is due to the difference between the 
control and anger condition (p = .001). Participants in the control condition make a 
significantly higher actual offer than they proposed (M = -41.67, SD = .106.74) in comparison 
to participants in the anger condition (M = 36.91, SD = 88.16), who make a significantly 
lower actual offer than they proposed. 
Hereafter we performed an ANOVA for the second negotiation round. The results of 
the ANOVA with the proposal offer of the second negotiation round as dependent variable 
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and the emotional feedback conditions as independent variable again showed a significant 
score between conditions for the proposal offer (F (3, 135) = 3.463, p = .018). In contrary to 
the ANOVA of the first negotiation round, we found a significant result for the actual offer as 
well (F (3, 126) = 6.836, p = .000). The last ANOVA of the adjustment-by-feedback score is 
also significant (F (3, 127) = 5.421, p = .002). 
The Bonferroni post hoc tests shows that again the difference is between the control 
and anger condition in the proposal offer (p = .023) and also in the actual offer (p = .001). The 
anger condition has as well a lower proposal (M = 3.50, SD = 1.26) as a lower actual offer (M 
= 3.05, SD = 1.00) than the control condition, which has a higher proposal (M = 4.19, SD = 
1.43) and actual offer (M = 4.06, SD = 1.44). Besides, in the second negotiation also the 
actual offer of the disappointment condition significantly differs from the control condition (p 
= .001). Just like the anger condition, the disappointment condition has a lower actual offer 
(M = 3.06, SD = .60) than the control condition (M = 4.06, SD = 1.44). A last significant 
result was seen in the adjustment-by-feedback deviation score between the disappointment 
condition and the control condition (p = .008), and between the disappointment condition and 
the happy condition (p = .008). While there is almost no difference between both offers for 
the participants in the control condition (M = .00, SD = .25) and for the happy condition (MD 
= .00, SD = .00), the participants in the disappointment condition do adjust their offer after 
receiving feedback in a way that is more cooperative (M = .34, SD = .60). See Table 2 for all 
means and standard deviations of the conditions. 
 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of ANOVA to check for differences 
  Anger Happiness Disapp. Control Total 
Prop. offer 
Round 1 
M 494.57 474.82 462.36 405.88  459.71 
SD 89.45 99.36 127.78 150.64 122.39 
Page | 26  
 
Actual 
offer 
Round 1 
M 463.41 476.29 459.24 481.82 470.29 
SD 102.53 99.35 110.83 92.55 100.76 
Adjustment 
score 
Round 1 
M 36.91 -1.47 8.79 -41.67 1.33 
SD 88.16 8.57 86.53 106.74 84.39 
Prop. offer 
Round 2 
M 3.38 3.5 3.61 4.19 3.68 
SD 1.26 .62 1.13 1.43 1.18 
Actual 
offer 
Round 2 
M 3.05 3.5 3.06 4.06 3.43 
SD 1.00 .62 .94 1.44 1.11 
Adjustment 
score 
Round 2 
M .23 .00 .34 .00 .14 
SD .55 .00 .60 .25 .44 
 
 
In order to test Hypothesis 1, that proposed offers and actual offers would not differ 
for participants in the control and in the happy condition, proposed prices and actual prices 
and proposed offer for delivery time and actual offer for delivery time are compared with a t-
tests for dependent samples. This executed by a one sample t-test with a test value of zero. 
This difference score of zero is chosen because it means there is no change in offer when the 
adjustment-by-feedback score is equal to zero. It is important to compare happiness and the 
control condition with zero adjustment in offer, because participants in these positive 
feedback conditions did sometimes adjust their proposed offer. We call this the zero 
adjustment score. For this analysis we computed four extra variables for the deviation scores 
of happiness and the control condition in both negotiations. For completeness we also 
executed this t-test and the deviation score variables for anger and disappointment. Hereafter 
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we tested for significant differences in deviation scores: the difference between the proposal 
and actual offer in the negotiation.  
The one sample t-test with the deviation score for each condition and negotiation 
round separately shows that in the first negotiation the average deviation score of the control 
condition is significantly below zero (MD = . -41.67, SD = 106.74, p = .041). Happiness, on 
the contrary, is not significantly different from zero adjustment in the first negotiation round 
(MD = -1.47, SD = 8.57, p = .325). Another finding is that in the first negotiation the average 
deviation score of anger is significantly higher than zero adjustment (MD = 36.91, SD = 88.16, 
p = .024), while disappointment, just like happiness, is not significant (MD = 8.78, SD = 
86.53, p = .564). In the second negotiation round no significant differences between zero 
adjustment and an emotion is found for the control condition (MD = .00, SD = .25, p = 1.000), 
happiness and disappointment (MD = -10.42, SD = 60.88, p = .340). However, the anger 
condition is again significantly higher than zero adjustment (MD = .23, SD = .55, p = .023). 
Here in the second negotiation, anger is the only significant emotional condition. See Table 2 
for all means, significance levels and confidence interval differences of the conditions in 
comparison to the zero adjustment score. To summarize: in both negotiations anger has a 
significantly higher mean than zero adjustment, but also the control condition differs 
significantly from zero adjustment during the first negotiation round. Opposed to the anger 
condition, the control condition has a significantly lower mean than zero adjustment, which is 
an unexpected finding because the control and happiness condition were supposed to be no 
different than zero adjustment at all. See Table 3 for the mean differences, significances and 
confidence intervals in comparison to the zero adjustment score. 
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Table 3. MD, significance and confidence intervals of conditions compared to zero 
 
Negotiation 
Round 1 
 Anger Happiness Disappointment Control 
p .024 .325 .564 .041 
Mean 
difference 
36.91 -1.47 8.78 -41.67 
Lower CI 5.12 -4.46 -21.90 -81.53 
Upper CI 68.70 1.52 39.47 -1.81 
Negotiation 
Round 1 
p .023 - .340 1.000 
Mean 
difference 
.23 - -10.42 .00 
Lower CI .04 - -32.37 -.09 
Upper CI .43 - 11.53 .09 
 
In hypotheses two and three we hypothesize that disappointment leads to larger 
concessions than anger and that anger leads to larger modification of the proposed offer 
concessions than happy or neutral emotions, which are expected to have no significant 
influence in concession between the proposal and actual offer. With modification of the 
proposed offer we mean the adjustment of the proposed offer to the actual offer, after 
receiving feedback of the adherents; also the adjustment-by-feedback score. 
After the previously done ANOVA, prior to analyses for hypothesis 1, I wanted to do 
a hypothesis-guided follow-up t test, with an alpha level of .01 to avoid alpha inflation. 
Therefore the second and third hypotheses were also analyzed with the independent samples t-
test where the deviation scores between the proposal and actual offer were compared between 
the emotional conditions. In the analyses we computed a difference score: the adjustment-by-
feedback score. This is the difference between the proposal and the actual offer, as dependent 
variable.  The emotional feedback of the adherents is taken into account as independent 
variable. Participants that only filled in one out of two offers, and thus had a missing score, 
were left out of the analysis because a deviation score when there is only one out of two offers 
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available cannot be computed. This test was executed to compare if similar results occur as in 
the ANOVA between the proposal and actual offers of different conditions when we take a 
closer look at the difference score between offers.  
 
Hypothesis 2 states that anger leads to larger modifications of the proposed offer than 
happy or neutral emotions. First we compared anger and happiness. The independent samples 
t-test (α < .01) shows there is no significant difference between the happy (M = -1.47, SD = 
8.57) and anger condition (M = 39.71, SD = 88.16) for the modification of the proposed price 
of negotiation round 1; t (30.518) = 2.590, p = .015. For the modification of proposed delivery 
time of negotiation round 2 there is also no significant difference between the happy (M = .00, 
SD = .00) and anger condition (M = .21, SD = .54); t (30) = 2.145, p = .040.  
Hereafter we compared anger with the control condition. The independent samples t-
test (α < .01) shows there is a significant difference between the control (M = -41.67, SD = 
106.74) and anger condition (M = 39.71, SD = 88.16) in negotiation round 1; t (59) = 3.251, p 
= .002. The control condition has a lower mean than the anger condition. This is a large effect 
size according to Cohen’s d (d = .831). On the contrary, for negotiation round 2 there is no 
significant difference between the control (M = .00, SD = .25) and anger condition (M = .21, 
SD = .54); t (42.117) = -1.949, p = .058.  
 
Hypothesis 3 states that disappointment leads to larger modification of the proposed 
offers than happy, neutral or angry emotions. At first we compared disappointment and 
happiness. The independent samples t-test (α < .01) shows no significant difference between 
the happy (M = -1.47, SD = 8.57) and disappointment condition (M = 8.79, SD = 86.53) in 
negotiation 1; t (65) = -.688, p = .494. However, for negotiation 2 there is a significant 
difference between the happy (M = .00, SD = .00) and disappointment condition (M = .34, SD 
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= .60); t (30) = -3.159, p = .004. The happy condition has a lower mean than the 
disappointment condition. This is a medium effect size according to Cohen’s d (d = .742).   
Hereafter we compared disappointment with the control condition. The independent 
samples t-test shows no significant difference between the control (M = -41.67, SD = 106.74) 
and disappointed condition (M = 8.79, SD = 86.53) in negotiation round 1; t (61) = -2.069, p 
= .043. However, for negotiation round 2 there is a significant difference between the control 
(M = .00, SD = .25) and disappointment condition (M = .34, SD = .60); t (40.245) = -2.914, p 
= .006. The control condition has a lower mean than the disappointment condition. This is a 
medium effect size according to Cohen’s d (d = .738).   
At last we compared disappointment with anger. The independent samples t-test (α 
< .01) shows no significant difference between the anger (M = 39.71, SD = 88.16) and 
disappointment condition (M = 8.79, SD = 86.53) in negotiation round 1; t (62) = 1.416, p 
= .162. For negotiation round 2 there is also no significant difference between the anger (M 
= .21, SD = .54) and disappointment condition (M = .339, SD = .597); t (60) = -.889, p = .377.  
 
We explored the means of all conditions to make a difference between the proposal 
offer before feedback and the second offer after feedback.  Because there can especially be 
found a difference between the control and anger condition in the first negotiation and 
between the disappointment and happy condition and between disappointment and the control 
condition in the second negotiation, we look at their means. See Table 3 for all means and 
standard deviations of the proposal offer and actual offer of all conditions and for both 
negotiation rounds. Participants in the control condition have by far the lowest proposal 
offer )M = 405.88, SD = 150.64) while the anger condition has the highest proposal offer (M = 
494.57, SD = 89.45). Both conditions adjust their offer as well: the control condition offers 
more (M = 481.82, SD = 92.55) and the anger condition offers less (M = 463.41, SD = 102.52). 
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In the second negotiation the participants in the control and happiness condition did not 
change their offer, where the disappointment and anger condition have a lower actual offer 
than they intended in their proposal. Especially participants in the disappointment condition 
offer less (M = .3.06, SD = .94 than the control (M = 4.06, SD = 1.43) and happy condition (M 
= 3.50, SD = .615). Just like the disappointment condition, also the anger condition shows a 
lower actual offer (M = 3.06, SD = .94) again in comparison with the control and happy 
condition.  
 
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of both offers in both negotiation rounds 
 
Negotiation 
Round 1 
  Anger Happiness Disapp. Control Total 
Proposal 
offer 
M 494.57 474.82 462.36 405.88 459.71 
SD 89.45 99.36 127.78 150.64 122.39 
Actual 
offer 
M 463.41 476.29 459.24 481.82 470.29 
SD 102.52 99.35 110.83 92.55 100.76 
Negotiation 
Round 1 
 
Proposal 
offer 
M 3.38 3.50 3.61 4.06 3.68 
SD 1.26 .615 1.13 1.43 1.18 
Actual 
offer 
M 3.05 3.50 3.06 4.06 3.43 
SD 1.00 .615 .94 1.43 1.11 
 
Juxtaposition of different analyses  
When comparing all emotional feedback conditions together in an ANOVA, a 
significant main effect for emotion shows for the proposal offer of negotiation round 1 (F (3, 
135) = 3.497, p = .017) and for the proposal offer (F (3, 135) = 3.463, p = .018) and actual 
offer  (F (3, 126) = 6.836, p = <.001) of negotiation round 2. This means that at least two out 
of four emotional feedback conditions differ significantly from each other in their offer. For 
the first negotiation round about money a Bonferroni post hoc test shows a significance was 
between the control and anger condition (p = .015). For the second negotiation round about 
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delivery time the difference was between the control and anger condition in the proposal offer 
(p = .023) and in the actual offer (p = .001). In the second offer of negotiation round 2 also 
disappointment significantly differs from the control condition (p = .001). This shows that the 
second negotiation round leads to more significant results than the first negotiation round 
when the conditions are being compared with each other. Interesting to note is that all of the 
significant comparison results are in combination with the control condition. When we 
compare these ANOVA results with the one sample t-test where the conditions are being 
compared with a deviation score of zero adjustment, we can assume that the control condition 
and the negative emotions anger and disappointment are extreme in the opposite direction. 
For example in negotiation round 2 anger scores significantly higher than the other conditions, 
but no significantly different deviation score from zero can be related to the control group. 
However, when the control group and the anger condition are being compared directly in the 
ANOVA post hoc test there is a significant result. The confidence intervals show an 
interesting difference between the control and anger condition, namely a significant lower 
difference score for the control condition (only in the first negotiation) and a significant 
higher difference score for the anger condition (in both negotiations). Because the adjustment-
by-feedback deviation score is based on the proposal offer minus the offer after receiving 
feedback, this means that in negotiation round 1 the control condition has a lower proposal 
offer (M = 405.88, SD = 150.64) and a higher actual offer (M = 481.82, SD = 92.55), while 
this is the opposite for the anger condition in the proposal (M = 494.57, SD = 89.45) and 
actual offer (M = 463.07, SD = 102.52).  
In addition, the independent samples t-test with deviation score as dependent variable 
shows a significant effect with a large effect size between the control and anger condition in 
the first negotiation (p = .002), but for negotiation two significant effects with medium effect 
sizes for disappointment, with happiness for the proposal offer (p = .004) and with the control 
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condition for the actual offer (p = .006). This means that, when we compare the results of the 
independent samples t-test with the results of the ANOVA post hoc test, in the second 
negotiation round participants in the disappointment condition make significantly larger 
modification of the proposed offers than participants in the anger condition. 
 
 Hypotheses with moderators 
The last three hypotheses are about the moderating variables need to belong, 
narcissism and power. Because we compare the means of groups to find out if they differ on 
the independent interval variable, we test these hypotheses with variance analysis as well and 
therefore we make use of an ANOVA. In the analyses we had a difference score for 
negotiation round 1 and for negotiation round 2 as dependent variable: the adjustment-by-
feedback score. Each moderating variable (need to belong, narcissism and power) together 
with emotion are the independent variables.  
In order to analyze the effect of constituency’s emotions and need to belong on 
negotiation behavior in the first part of the negotiation. Therefore we perform several 
ANOVA’s with the executed median for the need to belong score of the participants and 
emotion. The modification of proposed offers were submitted to a 4 (constituency’s emotion: 
happy, angry, disappointed and control) x 2 (need to belong: low vs. high) ANOVA. 
Hypothesis 4 states that a high need to belong leads to larger modification of the proposed 
offers than a low need to belong. Results revealed a main effect of emotion (F (3, 121) = 
31235.74; p = .004) showing that in the first negotiation round participants with angry (M = 
36.91, SD = 88.16) and disappointed constituents (M = 8.79, SD = 86.53) modified their 
proposal offer more than participants with happy constituents (M = -1.47, SD = 8.57) or 
participants in the control condition (M = -41.67, SD = 106.74). The main effect of the need to 
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belong (F (1, 121) = 1.100, p = .296) and the interaction of emotion and the need to belong (F 
(3, 121) = .203; p = .894) were not significant. 
In the second negotiation round about delivery time however, neither the main effects 
of the need to belong (p = .403) and emotion (p = .571) nor the interaction are significant (p 
= .544). See Table 4 for the variance analysis of emotional feedback by the need to belong for 
both negotiation rounds.  
 
Table 4. Variance analysis of emotional feedback by the need to belong for both negotiations 
 
 
Negotiation 
Round 1 
 Main effect 
need to belong 
Main effect 
emotion 
Interaction 
df 1 3 3 
F 1.100 4.709 .203 
p .296 .004 .894 
Negotiation 
Round 2 
df 1 3 3 
F .706 .672 .571 
p .403 .571 .544 
 
Subsequently we analyze the effect of constituency’s emotions and narcissism on 
negotiation behavior in the first part of the negotiation. Therefore we perform several 
ANOVA’s with the executed median for the narcissism score of the participants and emotion. 
The modification of proposed offers were submitted to a 4 (constituency’s emotion: happy, 
angry, disappointed and control) x 2 (narcissism: low vs. high) ANOVA. Hypothesis 5 states 
that a high score on narcissism leads to smaller modification of the proposed offers than when 
participants score low on narcissism. In the first negotiation the main effect of emotion is 
significant (p = .002), whereas the main effect of narcissism (p = .836) and the interaction of 
emotion and narcissism (p = .800) are not significant. In the second negotiation also the main 
effect of emotion is significant (p = .003), but neither the main effects of narcissism (p = .686) 
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and the interaction are significant (p = .821). See Table 5 for the variance analysis of 
emotional feedback by narcissism for both negotiations.  
Table 5. Variance analysis of emotional feedback by narcissism for both negotiations 
 
 
Negotiation 
Round 1 
 Main effect 
narcissism 
Main effect 
emotion 
Interaction 
df 1 3 3 
F .043 5.211 .335 
p .836 .002 .800 
Negotiation 
Round 2 
df 1 3 3 
F .164 5.001 .306 
p .686 .003 .821 
 
 The last moderator to analyze is power. I analyze the effect of constituency’s emotions 
and ones’ feeling of power on negotiation behavior in the first part of the negotiation. 
Therefore several ANOVA’s are performed with the executed median for the subjective sense 
of power that the participants experienced and emotion. The modification of proposed offers 
were submitted to a 4 (constituency’s emotion: happy, angry, disappointed and control) x 2 
(power: low vs. high) ANOVA. Hypothesis 6 states that in the negative feedback conditions 
(anger and disappointment), low power leads to larger modification of the proposed offers 
than high power. In the first negotiation the main effect of emotion is significant (p = .005), 
whereas the main effect of power (p = .739) and the interaction of emotion and power (p 
= .739) are not significant. In the second negotiation however, neither the main effects of 
power (p = .309) and emotion (p = .400) nor the interaction are significant (p = .377). See 
Table 6 for the variance analysis of emotional feedback by power for both negotiations. 
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Table 6. Variance analysis of emotional feedback by power for both negotiations 
 
 
Negotiation 
Round 1 
 Main effect 
power 
Main effect 
emotion 
Interaction 
df 1 3 3 
F .111 4.521 .615 
p .739 .005 .607 
Negotiation 
Round 2 
df 1 3 3 
F 1.043 .990 1.041 
p .309 .400 .377 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Participants negotiated on behalf of four-person constituencies who gave them 
emotionally charged feedback during two negotiation rounds, one about a selling price and 
one about delivery time. The participants had to negotiate with a representative of another 
group with opposite interests. At first the participant had to make a proposal offer, then the 
group members gave their feedback (happy, disappointed, angry or no emotion) and at last he 
participant had to draw up an actual and final offer.  
The intergroup context of this study and the involvement of other group members who 
express their opinion is not completely new. Earlier similar research has been done to the 
representation of different emotional feedback (Steinel et al., 2009) and orientation of the 
feedback towards the person or the offer (Lelieveld et al., 2011). The interesting part about 
this study is the laying of the foundations and to find out the effect of happy, angry, 
disappointed or not emotionally charged feedback on a the behavior of a negotiator. The 
results show that receiving angry feedback leads to cooperative behavior on part of the 
representative negotiator. We found this adjustment between the proposal and actual offer in 
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as well the first negotiation round about money (p = .024) as the second negotiation round 
about delivery time (p = .023). Also receiving no emotional feedback proved to lead to a 
change in offer (p = .041), which might be due to a difference in the presentation of the 
scenario and to more extreme offers in the control condition. Hereafter I will discuss the 
hypotheses, whereupon the limitations of this study and implications for future research will 
be given. 
 
Hypotheses about differences between emotions 
Hypothesis 1 – In the first negotiation the anger condition has a relatively high first 
offer, so here it is a more logical option to lower the offer when you do not know the meaning 
of the (angry) feedback. Because it is unclear what direction the adherents prefer, the 
negotiator is uncertain if the emotion is oriented towards a lower or higher offer. When the 
proposal offer is high, just like the first offer of the anger condition in the first negotiation, the 
negotiator is probably more inclined to lower the offer. When the proposal offer is low, just 
like the first offer of the control condition, the negotiator is probably more inclined to higher 
the offer. The proposal offer is therefore a crucial factor in direction of the actual offer. An 
unexpected finding is that the participants who do not receive any feedback do also change 
their proposal offer. A possible reason is a difference in the scenario between the control 
condition and the experimental conditions with emotional feedback. In the control condition 
participants did not expect to receive feedback from their adherents. They may have 
anticipated by lowering their offer. Therefore the hypothesis that participants who receive 
neutral emotional feedback do not change their proposal offer after receiving no feedback is 
rejected, but the hypothesis that participants who receive happy emotional feedback do not 
change their proposal offer after receiving happy reactions can be accepted. 
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Hypothesis 2 – Participants that receive anger feedback from their group do adjust 
their proposal offer in as well negotiation round 1 (p = .024) as in negotiation round 2 (p 
= .023). Therefore we can at least assume that angry emotions of the adherents lead to larger 
modifications of the proposed offers. The adjusted offers are present between the control and 
anger condition for the first negotiation (p = .002), but for the second negotiation no 
significant result has been found between these two emotions. Even though the modification 
of the proposed offer after receiving angry feedback does differ from zero, it does not differ 
from happy feedback in both negotiations and the no emotion condition in negotiation 2. 
Therefore the second hypothesis that anger leads to larger modification of the proposed offers 
than happiness and the control condition cannot be confirmed. 
Hypothesis 3 – The results show that disappointed feedback differs from happy 
feedback (p = .004) and from the control group with no feedback (p = .005). This difference 
was not present in the first negotiation. In the second negotiation especially participants in the 
disappointment condition adjust their offer. A possible explanation may be that the adherents 
show feedback of disappointment for the second time, which makes the participants feel 
guilty because they let their adherents down again. As a reaction upon this feeling of guilt 
they adjust their offer even more extreme than they did before in the first negotiation. If guilt 
is indeed the reason for a more adjusted second offer when again receiving disappointed 
reactions from group members, then this finding is in accordance with the study of Lelieveld 
et al. (2013) who concluded that when guilt is evoked during a negotiation, the target elicits 
generous offers. We can state that hypothesis 3 is true on part of the neutral and happiness 
condition: when participants feel that their adherents are really disappointed in them, they 
make larger modification of the proposed offers. Because the anger condition only made a 
small modification of the proposed offer, we cannot presume that disappointment and anger 
are different in the way they change a negotiators behavior. 
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Hypotheses with moderators 
 Hypotheses 4-6 – In none of the negotiation rounds the need to belong, narcissism and 
power prove to be of influence, but emotion does in the first negotiation round about money. 
In the second negotiation round where there has to be negotiated about delivery time in weeks, 
emotion is only of influence for narcissism (p = .003), but not for the need to belong and 
power. A possible explanation for this difference in might be that money is more appealing to 
the imagination than delivery time in weeks. 
 
Limitations and future research 
  
 There has been a difference in negotiation presentation between the control condition 
and the experimental conditions. This is due to the fact that the negotiations for the control 
condition had less focus on receiving feedback than the negotiations for the experimental 
conditions. In future research this difference in negotiations should take the leveling out of 
this difference into account, for example as a change in the scenario presentation or in 
comparison between the conditions. 
 Another adjustment in the scenario and in both negotiation rounds should be more 
clarity about why the adherents show their emotion and what they want to achieve by showing 
their feedback: do they want a higher or lower offer? This clarity in scenario is also important 
for the proposal offers: is it better for the own party to offer a high or low amount of money or 
weeks? This is important because the direction of the actual offers depends on the value of the 
proposal offers.  
Also, the participants that only filled in one out of two offers in either negotiation one 
or negotiation two, had more extreme offers. Because with one out of two scores missing we 
cannot execute a deviation score, the participants with missing values in offer were left out of 
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the analysis. A research limitation therefore could be that the measured effects are weaker 
because of this selection by incompleteness. This might decrease the chance on a 
manipulation effect. 
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Informatie voor deelnemers aan wetenschappelijk onderzoek 2015 
Sectie Sociale Psychologie, Universiteit van Leiden 
 
Welkom in ons onderzoekslaboratorium!  
 
De komende 60 minuten zal je je bijdrage leveren aan drie verschillende onderzoeken.  
 
- Onderzoek 1: In dit onderzoek gaan we kijken naar de beoordeling van natuurlijke 
omgevingen en naar mogelijke gevolgen die kunnen optreden tijdens een wandeling in een 
bepaalde natuurlijke omgeving. Je zult hiervoor d.m.v. foto’s een eigen wandeling door een 
park maken, waarna je een aantal vragenlijsten invult. 
- Onderzoek 2: Dit onderzoek gaat over de indrukken die mensen hebben van sociale groepen 
in de maatschappij. Het is onze intentie om te onderzoeken hoe sociale groepen worden 
gezien door “de Nederlandse samenleving”. We zijn dus niet geïnteresseerd in jouw 
persoonlijke overtuigingen, maar wel in hoe jij denkt dat deze groepen worden gezien door 
anderen in de maatschappij. We zullen je hierover enkele (open) vragen voorleggen.  
- Onderzoek 3: In dit onderzoek zul je deelnemen aan een onderhandeling met een andere 
groep. Je krijgt een scenario voorgelegd en -- afhankelijk van de groepsrol die je toegewezen 
krijgt -- zul je je mening geven over een bod óf zelf een bieding uitbrengen. Naast de 
onderhandeling zul je een aantal vragenlijsten invullen. 
 
Voordat je begint is het belangrijk dat je het volgende weet: 
- De onderzoeken nemen in totaal ongeveer 60 minuten in beslag. Voor je deelname aan deze 
onderzoeken ontvang je in totaal €6,50 of 2 credits. 
- Je medewerking aan dit onderzoek is vrijwillig. Als je toestemming geeft om aan dit onderzoek 
mee te doen, heb je altijd de vrijheid om op die beslissing terug te komen. Je hoeft hiervoor 
geen verklaring te geven. 
- Alle gegevens worden anoniem verzameld.  
 
 
Voor vragen, opmerkingen of klachten over het onderzoek kun je contact opnemen met de 
onderzoekers:  
- Onderzoek 1: Henk Staats, 071-5273413, staats@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
- Onderzoek 2: Félice van Nunspeet, 071-5273413, nunspeetfvan@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
- Onderzoek 3: Wolfgang Steinel, 071-5273634, wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl 
 
 
Ben je 18 jaar of ouder en heb je bovenstaande gelezen en begrepen? Dan kun je de 
toestemmingsverklaring op de achterzijde ondertekenen. Indien gewenst kan je een kopie van 
dit formulier meekrijgen.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page | 45  
 
Scenario: budget for summaries 
(Robertson, 2011; aangepast) 
 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCREEN 1 
 
Hello! 
 
First of all, thank you for participating in this experiment.  
 
During this experiment you will participate in a negotiation, together with three other 
participants who are in the other cubicles right now. The four of you will form a group. With 
this group you will negotiate with another group. Both groups will be represented by one of 
the members (the representative). The representatives will directly communicate with one 
another and the group will provide feedback to the representative about the negotiation.  
 
There are two different parts. In the first part, you are either the representative or a member of 
the constituency during a negotiation. Since you are with the four of you the computer will 
randomly choose which role you are going to fulfill. This part will take approximately 15 
minutes of your time. The second part is a questionnaire, which will take approximately 5 
minutes of your time. 
 
Please fill in your name in the text box below. This does not have to be your own name. 
 
 
 
Press SPACE to start the first part of this experiment. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SCREEN 2 
 
PART ONE 
First we let the computer decide which role you are going to fulfill.  
There are three possible roles you can get: 
 
1. Representative of selling party: You are the representative in this negotiation. This 
means you are responsible for the final decision you make for the group you represent.  
2. Member of selling party: Together with 2 other participants you form the 
constituency of the negotiating group. As a constituency member, you can give 
feedback to the representative about his/her decided offer. 
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3. Buyer party: You are the buying party in this negotiation. Therefore you will make 
the first offer to the selling party. After receiving the reaction of the representative of 
the selling party you can decide whether to accept the offer of bargain further. 
 
Press SPACE to start determine roles. 
 
*loading bar* 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCREEN 3 
  
Your role is: REPRESENTATIVE OF SELLING PARTY 
 
1. Representative: You are the representative in this negotiation. This means you are 
responsible for the final decision you make for the group you represent. You will 
negotiate with another person who also represents a group. 
 
On the next screen, you will find the negotiation scenario. Read it carefully and good luck! 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCREEN 4 
 
 “Together with the three others students you form a community group; you are making 
summaries for several college courses and share these summaries with other students. This 
initiative has started years ago and is always very much appreciated by other students. The 
summaries you make are sold to StudentPlus, the organization that distributes the summaries 
among the students.  
 
The summaries used to be given away for free. Now, however, there is no budget anymore 
and the summaries will have to be sold to cover the 200 Euro expenses for the materials, 
copying, etc for one package of summaries. You are familiar with the fact that StudentPlus 
also sells other packages of summaries, with a maximum price of 600 euro’s for a package of 
summaries. 
  
Your community group and you therefore have to sell the summaries to the students for at 
least 200 Euro. The maximum price you can ask to earn some money with it is 600 Euro; 
StudentPlus will not buy the summaries above this price. 
  
In order to decide the price you need to get in contact with the financial union of the 
organization StudentPlus. You know that this union consists of a few students as well and that 
you need to talk and negotiate with their spokesman Jamie. Your group will provide you 
feedback to decide the ultimate price for selling the package of summaries.”  
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 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SCREEN 5 
 
Instruction: 
As earlier mentioned you are the representative and the other participants in this experiment 
are your community group. Together the four of you will decide what you are going to offer to 
the other group and their spokesman Jamie. You will be the only one who is in contact with 
Jamie.  
 
In a few minutes Jamie will make you an offer upon which you need to respond. You can 
either decide to accept or reject the offer. When you reject the offer, you are allowed to give 
Jamie a new offer. You can freely choose whether this offer is higher or lower than the offer 
made by Jamie.  
Because you are chosen to be the decision maker for your group, you get two decision 
moments: 
 
(1) Before responding to Jamie’s offer, you will make a suggestion about the decision to the 
three students of your community group. Thereafter they will each provide you their feedback 
about your suggestion.  
(2) After receiving the feedback of your community group, you can choose to adjust your 
previously made decision and/or new offer. After your decision (whether to change or not 
change your suggestion) the last decision will be sent to Jamie. 
 
Remember: To cover the costs of making the summaries you need at least 200 Euros, and the 
maximum amount of money you can ask is 600 euros (above 600 euros no summaries are 
being sold). 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SCREEN 6 
 
Jamie’s offer:  
“Hi there, I am willing to sell you the package of your summary for 200 Euros.” 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SCREEN 7 
 
You can now think for one minute whether you like or dislike Jamie’s offer.  
 
If you accept his offer, you may fill in the same offer as Jamie.  
If you reject his offer, you can make a counter offer. 
 
Afterward making your decision, your community group will receive this suggestion for 
acceptation or rejection and a new offer to give you feedback as well! 
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Remember: To cover the costs of making the summaries you need at least 200 euros, and the 
maximum amount of money you can ask is 600 Euros (above 600 euros no summaries are 
being sold). 
 
*tijdbalk van 1 minuut tikt weg 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SCREEN 8 
 
Please make your decision: 
A. I want to accept Jamie’s offer and present the same offer 
B. I want to reject Jamie’s offer and present a new offer 
To present your suggestion, write a message to your community group. Declare whether you 
want to present the same offer as Jamie or present a new offer. Mention your suggestion in 
numbers. 
 
 
Remember: To cover the costs of making the summaries you need at least 200 Euros, and the 
maximum amount of money you can ask is 600 Euros (above 600 Euros no summaries are 
being sold). 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SCREEN 9 
Thank you for sharing your response. The next minute your community group will read about 
Jamie’s offer and your suggestion. Thereafter they will provide you each separately with 
feedback. 
 
The progress indicator shows the time left for your community group to type their feedback! 
 
*timeline of 20 seconds ticking away  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SCREEN 10 
 
The feedback provided by your community group will now be displayed. 
o Robin (student mate 1): (feedback komt op scherm tevoorschijn) 
o Sacha (student mate 2): (feedback komt op scherm tevoorschijn) 
o Lesley (student mate 3): (feedback komt op scherm tevoorschijn) 
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SCREEN 11 
 
You now have one minute to decide whether you continue your previously made suggestion 
or you want to change it. 
Please make your decision: 
A. I want to continue presenting my original decision to Jamie. 
B. After receiving feedback of my community group I want to change my original 
suggestion before presenting it to Jamie. 
 
If you chose option A, present your first and original offer to Jamie. 
If you chose option B, present your new offer to Jamie.  
Mention your offer in numbers. 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SCREEN 12 
  
Thank you for your offer! Your offer will now be send to Jamie. Together with the other group 
Jamie will make a decision about your offer. Afterwards Jamie will present this decision to 
you. 
 
In the meanwhile we would like to ask you to fill in some questionnaires. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SCREEN 13 
PART TWO 
This is the second and last part of this experiment.  
Please fill in the following questionnaires: 
 
*INVOEGEN QUESTIONNAIRES* 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SCREEN 13 
Thank you for your participation! 
During this experiment we investigated the effect of emotions of the adherents on a 
representative negotiator. We investigated the emotions happiness, anger and disappointment 
to see whether people change their proposal offer based on emotions of their own group.  
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Everyone participating in this research was allocated to be a representative during the 
negotiation. This means that there were no other group members involved, because the 
emotions of the adherents need to be homogeneous and expressed in a validated manner. 
For this research it is important that participants react on the information they get during the 
research, and therefore have no prior knowledge about what the instruments are supposed to 
measure. Therefore we would like to ask you to not share the content of this research with 
your fellow students. 
If you are interested to receive more information about the research results in a few months, 
you can fill in your e-mail address in the text box below. 
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Manipulation of Emotional Response (in Dutch) 
 
Onderhandelronde 1: Prijs 
Boos Robin: “Ik baal van je bod, ik ben er behoorlijk geïrriteerd door.” 
 Sacha: “Het idee dat je dit bod gaat voorleggen, maakt me nogal boos!” 
 Lesley: “Ik ben echt enorm gefrustreerd door dit bod!” 
Blij Robin: “Lekker beeeeeezig!” 
 Sacha: “Ik sluit me volledig aan bij je bod!” 
 Lesley: “Goed bod! Ik ben blij dat jij ons vertegenwoordigt.” 
Teleurgesteld Robin: “Jeetje, wat jammer dat je dit biedt..” 
 Sacha: “Ik vind het een nogal teleurstellend bod.” 
 Lesley: “Wat baal ik van jouw bod.” 
 
Onderhandelronde 2: Leveringstijd 
Boos Robin: “Pfff.... dit bod maakt me boos!!” 
 Sacha: “Dit bod maakt me erg pissig.” 
 Lesley: “Hoe haal je het in je hoofd dit te bieden?!” 
Blij Robin: “Top! Ik zeg doen.” 
 Sacha: “Goed bezig! Ga zo door!” 
 Lesley: “Prima! Dit bod maakt me helemaal blij hoor!”  
Teleurgesteld Robin: “Ik had het graag anders gezien, want dit bod stelt me teleur...” 
 Sacha: “Ik vind dit bod nogal tegenvallen.” 
 Lesley: “Ik vind jouw bod een afknapper..” 
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Need to Belong Scale 
(Leary, Kelly, Cottrell & Schreindorfer, 2005) 
Instructions: For each of the statements below, indicate the degree to which you agree or 
disagree with the statement by writing a number in the space beside the question using the 
scale below: 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Moderately disagree 
3 = Neither agree nor disagree 
4 = Moderately agree 
5 = Strongly agree 
_____ 1. If other people don't seem to accept me, I don't let it bother me. (*) 
_____ 2. I try hard not to do things that will make other people avoid or reject me. 
_____ 3. I seldom worry about whether other people care about me. (*) 
_____ 4. I need to feel that there are people I can turn to in times of need. 
_____ 5. I want other people to accept me. 
_____ 6. I do not like being alone. 
_____ 7. Being apart from my friends for long periods of time does not bother me. (*) 
_____ 8. I have a strong need to belong. 
_____ 9. It bothers me a great deal when I am not included in other people's plans. 
____ 10. My feelings are easily hurt when I feel that others do not accept me. 
(*) Recoded item 
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Narcissism Scale: The NPI-16 
(Ames, Rose & Anderson, 2006) 
 
Read each pair of statements below and place an “X” by the one that comes closest to 
describing your feelings and beliefs about yourself. You may feel that neither statement 
describes you well, but pick the one that comes closest. Please complete all pairs. 
/ NPI-16 Key: Responses consistent with narcissism are shown in bold. 
  
1. ___ I really like to be the center of attention   
 ___ It makes me uncomfortable to be the center of attention   
   
2. ___ I am no better or nor worse than most people 
 ___ I think I am a special person 
   
3. ___ Everybody likes to hear my stories   
 ___ Sometimes I tell good stories   
   
4. ___ I usually get the respect that I deserve   
 ___ I insist upon getting the respect that is due me   
   
5. ___ I don't mind following orders   
 ___ I like having authority over people   
   
6. ___ I am going to be a great person 
 ___ I hope I am going to be successful 
   
7. ___ People sometimes believe what I tell them   
 ___ I can make anybody believe anything I want them to   
   
8. ___ I expect a great deal from other people   
 ___ I like to do things for other people   
   
9. ___ I like to be the center of attention   
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 ___ I prefer to blend in with the crowd   
   
10. ___ I am much like everybody else   
 ___ I am an extraordinary person   
   
11. ___ I always know what I am doing   
 ___ Sometimes I am not sure of what I am doing 
   
12. ___ I don't like it when I find myself manipulating people   
 ___ I find it easy to manipulate people   
   
13. ___ Being an authority doesn't mean that much to me   
 ___ People always seem to recognize my authority 
   
14. ___ I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so   
 ___ When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed   
   
15. ___ I try not to be a show off   
 ___ I am apt to show off if I get the chance   
   
16. ___ I am more capable than other people   
 ___ There is a lot that I can learn from other people 
 
Scoring: compute proportion of responses consistent with narcissism.  
 
Background: The NPI-16 items are drawn from across the dimensions of Raskin and Terry’s 
(1988) 40-item measure. Relevant references are noted below. 
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Subjective sense of Power Scale 
(Anderson, John & Keltner, 2006) 
 Items 
In rating each of the items below, please use the following scale: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Disagree a 
little 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree a 
little 
Agree Agree 
strongly 
 
______1. I can get him/her/them to listen to what I say. 
______2. My wishes do not carry much weight.  
______3. I can get him/her/them to do what I want. 
______4. Even if I voice them, my views have little sway.  
______5. I think I have a great deal of power. 
______6. My ideas and opinions are often ignored.  
______7. Even when I try, I am not able to get my way.  
______8. If I want to, I get to make the decisions. 
